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ABSTRACT
The paper reports an interview-based study that considers market 
driving and market-driven activities within the disaggregated compo-
nents of the business model. The empirical study is of IKEA in China 
over a 10 year period. Market orientation is considered as a position on 
a continuum rather than as binary positions. The components of the 
business model are developed from the Osterwalder and Pigneur 
structure. Over the study period, the balance between driven and 
driving orientations within components of the business model chan-
ged in multiple ways. This article’s contribution is the illustration of 
disaggregating the market orientations of driven or driving activities 
and associating these with the particular components of the business 
model and so studying what happens to the driven-driving balance 
over time. The approach has wider applicability for attempts to under-
stand the dynamics of international retailing.
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Retail internationalisation has been a major focus in the scholarly treatment of retailer 
strategy over the last 20–25 years (e.g., Alexander and Doherty, 2010; Burt et al. 2008; Burt, 
Johansson, and Thelander 2007, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Chan, Finnegan, and Sternquist 
2011; Dawson 1994, 2001, 2007; Dawson and Mukoyama 2014; Jonsson and Foss 2011; 
Lowe and Wrigley 2010; Pellegrini 1991; Salmon and Tordjman 1989; Swoboda and Elsner 
2013; Swoboda, Berg, and Dabija 2014; Yu and Ramanathan 2012). In this research two 
features are evident. First, in common with other literature on international marketing 
(e.g., Gebrekidan, Hoc, and Syeda-Maosooda 2019; Pavlinek and Smith 1998; Rao- 
Nicholson and Khan 2017; Schmid and Kotulla, 2011; Theodosiou and Leonidou 2003; 
Yanik and Midgley, 2019), a recurring theme has been the standardisation and adaption of 
activities in foreign markets with a dichotomous view relating standardisation and adap-
tion to issues of the roles of head office and local operations. Secondly, despite inter-
nationalisation being recognized as a process taking place over many years, few studies, 
with the notable exception of Coe and Lee (2006, 2013) analyses of Tesco in Korea, explore 
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the internal dynamics of the retailer over an extended time period, preferring either 
a cross-sectional approach or limited comparisons of individual events at specific points 
in time. Given the previous work, there is an opportunity to extend research to take 
a more nuanced view of standardisation and adaption, by relating it to the more dynamic 
market-driven and market-driving processes, within a framework of the long-term 
dynamics of the business model underpinning the internationalisation processes.
Despite the importance of the business model of the retailer to the success or other-
wise of its international activity, there are few analyses of how, within this model, value is 
created for customers. Discussion has been undertaken more generally (e.g., Afuah, 2004; 
Amit and Zott 2001; Eriksson et al. 2008; Osterwalder and Pigneur 2010; Zott and Amit 
2010; Zott, Amit, and Massa 2011) but there is limited research on business models in 
retailing (for an exception, see Haas 2019; Sandberg 2013; Sorescu et al. 2011; Yrjölä, 2014) 
and in international retailing (for an exception, see Burt, Johansson, and Dawson 2016, 
2017). Within a consumer-facing and market-orientated industry, a retailer’s business 
model has to address particular challenges in internationalisation. Such challenges can 
be formulated in business model terms along the following lines: will the value that has 
been delivered successfully to customers in the home market be created abroad or will an 
alternative orientation be needed to deliver value to the customers in the foreign market? 
Which routines and actions associated with the various components of the business 
model can be transferred and which have to be changed? And, how do processes change, 
in terms of the marketing orientation, as the retailer, over time, operates in the new 
market?
The adaption vs. standardisation and market orientation paradigms are linked (e.g., 
Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Narver and Slater 1990; Slater and Naver, 1994) but take 
a different perspective on the nature of the changes. Whilst the adaption vs. standardisa-
tion perspective focuses on the results of activities the marketing orientation is more 
related to the processes that generate the various activities. (e.g., Day 1994, 1999; 
Jaworski, Kohli, and Sahay 2000; Kumar 1997; Kumar, Scheer, and Kotler 2000). The 
marketing orientation paradigm with its focus on the processes and routines involved is 
useful to highlight the complexity and interactions of processes and can be considered at 
different levels of disaggregation and abstraction. Being market driven, in our context, 
means adopting processes that result in aspects of the retail business model being 
adapted to the local market and local tastes, while market driving means transferring, 
relatively unchanged, established processes and routines in the retailer’s business model. 
This general market-driven – market-driving distinction has been explored in research on 
international retailing (Elg et al. 2011; Ghauri, Tarnovskaya, and Elg 2008; Tarnovskaya, Elg, 
and Burt 2008). This article’s contribution is based on the need to disaggregate the driven 
or driving activities associated with the particular components of the business model and 
also studying what happens to the driven-driving balance over time.
We focus in this study on one retailer’s activity in one market over an extended period. 
The research question addressed is: How do the components of the retail business model 
and their marketing orientation perspectives change over time?
The retailer in focus is IKEA, known not least for its alleged standardised and market- 
driving approach to home furnishing retailing around the globe. This article has 
a longitudinal perspective and builds on data collected concerning IKEA’s business 
model in China on two occasions, one in the early 2000s (2005–2008) and the latter 
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with a focus on 2014–2017. IKEA was one of the first big-box retailers to enter the Chinese 
market. Data from the first period have previously been published (Burt, Johansson, and 
Thelander 2011a,b; Johansson and Thelander 2009) with a different focus (broad analyses 
of marketing strategy) and interviews have been recorded to create this longitudinal 
study of a major retailer’s business model over time. Hereby, new knowledge is created on 
the development and evolution of a business model – and market orientation – over 
some 10 years.
The time period has been an important one in the development of the Chinese market, 
and provides important insights into how retail firms adapt or retain established pro-
cesses. China, as a large, growing and changing market affected by significant trade 
liberalisation and institutional change, has been a major focus for research on different 
aspects of international retailing (e.g., Colla and Dupuis, 2002; Chung 2003; Goldman 
2000, 2001; Hang and Goldley, 2009; Hendon 2008; Jia and Wang 2013; Siebers 2011; 
Tacconelli and Wrigley 2009; Zang and Wei 2015; Zhuang 2013). None of these studies has 
explored integrating the concepts we use to gain understanding of the changes under-
taken by a large retailer over an extended period operating in a foreign market.
The paper comprises four sections. First, we review relevant studies within the business 
model and marketing orientation literature and present the business model framework 
within which we evaluate market orientation processes. The research method is then 
described. The results of interviews that relate changes in marketing orientation to the 
several stages of the business model then follow. A final section discusses the results and 
indicates potential areas for future study.
Theoretical framework
To understand the dynamic nature of a retailer’s internationalisation we apply an 
approach that combines a business model framework with the components considered 
through the lens of marketing orientation. This framework enables disaggregation of the 
market driving-market driven activities across the business model. By considering the 
components of the business model we can identify whether the retailer seeks to change 
market conditions to create a new market in order to exploit specific firm advantages 
(market driving) or to adjust the business model in order to adapt and respond to market 
conditions (market driven). The combined framework provides an approach that allows us 
to structure and analyse the dynamics and change in international retailer practices over 
time.
Business models
The concept of a business model provides a framework to capture and structure the 
complexity of the methods for value creation in a firm. Since the early 2000s, analysis of 
business models has become an established theme within research on strategy and has 
a substantial literature (e.g., Amit and Zott 2001; Baden-Fuller and Morgan 2010; 
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart 2010; Chesbrough 2009; Hedman and Kalling 2003; 
Johnson, Christensen, and Kagermann 2008; Magretta 2002; Markides and Charitou 
2004; Richardson 2008; Shafer, Smith, and Linder 2005; Smith, Binns, and Tushman 
2010; Teese, 2010; Yip 2004; Zott and Amit 2008, 2010; Zott, Amit, and Massa 2011). 
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Despite the large number of studies, relatively few address the conceptualisation of the 
business model beyond a general definition identifying and characterising the elements 
involved. For the business model to be used as an analytical tool, there is a need to specify 
the constituents of the model – its concepts, variables, internal and external relationships 
and particularly its various dynamics – and to apply these in an empirical context. Sorescu 
et al. (2011) conclude that there is no commonly accepted definition of a business model 
but, drawing on Zott and Amit (2010), they suggest:
A business model is a well-specified system of interdependent structures, activities, and processes 
that serves as a firm’s organizing logic for value creation (for its customers) and value appro-
priation (for itself and its partners). (p 4)
Amit and Zott (2002) suggest similarly, but from a market-driven perspective, that:
[. . .] a business model is a bundle of specific activities — an activity system — conducted to 
satisfy the perceived needs of the market, along with the specification of which parties (a 
company or its partners) conduct which activities, and how these activities are linked to each 
other. (p 18)
Central in both, as in other definitions of business models (e.g., Osterwalder and Pigneur 
2010), is that the business model aims to capture how an organisation creates or captures 
customer value, and how interdependent activities in the organisation are organised to 
create value. In one of the few studies of retailer business models, Cao (2014) argues that 
a business model should include at least three essential value-based premises: a value 
proposition, how value creation and delivery is performed, and value appropriation, 
particularly from innovation, but says little about the nature of the processes that link 
these aspects of value. Trkman, Budler, and Groznik (2015), addressing business models 
from a supply chain perspective, see products, partners/suppliers, employees, customers 
and processes as different parts of a business model, all in the context of what they call 
business environment. Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010, see also Osterwalder et al, 2005, 
2014), discussing new types of business models, conceptualise a business model in a more 
nuanced way as comprised of nine different, interdependent parts; value proposition, 
relationship (to customers), customer segment, channels (of communication), revenues, 
key resources, key activities, key partners and costs. This conceptualisation of a business 
model has been applied in the retail context (Burt, Johansson, and Dawson 2016).
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2010) suggest similar components as Osterwalder and 
Pigneur but add the structure of the value chain required to create and distribute the 
offering and complementary assets needed to support the competitive strategy of the 
firm. While the relationships in the chain are encompassed by key activities and key 
resources in Osterwalder et al. (2005; 2014), competitive strategy is an addition. Our view 
is that strategy is the result of the business model, not part of the business model (e.g., 
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart 2010; Teece 2010). Sorescu et al (2011, p 85–86) specifically 
focus on retail business models, and argue that a business model for a retail firm 
incorporates three components: retailing format; i.e., specific structures of organizing 
the retailing activities into coherent processes that provide the customer experience, 
retailing activities; acquiring, stocking, displaying and exchanging goods and services that 
fulfill the customer experience and finally retailing governance; the actors involved in 
creating and delivering customer experiences, as well as the mechanisms (such as 
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contract and incentive systems) that motivate these actors to carry out their roles in 
fulfilling the customer experience. This is useful but we feel more disaggregation of the 
model is required to fully understand the dynamic aspects.
Clearly, there are similarities among these conceptualisations of a business model but 
a notable absence is any consideration of the dynamics of the development of the model. 
Most authors seem to agree that within a business model’s conceptualisation there is 
a ‘front’ – customer facing – element including the offer as well as the target groups of 
customers and interactions with them. Secondly, there are elements to denote the 
resources and activities necessary to produce the value offer. Finally, most authors also 
recognise that governance processes exist, to determine which parts of the business 
model are executed inside or outside the firm. This threefold division is useful and 
provides a basis on which to explore more disaggregation. Developing this earlier work, 
particularly that of Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) we define the key components of 
a business model as:
(1) a customer facing value proposition, which describes the offer in terms of products 
and services and also what is to be gained (or avoided) by customers through the 
products and services sold.
(2) a range of relationships with customers which can range from being very close, 
engaged and personal to impersonal and distant.
(3) channels of communication which are the different ways the firm tries to reach the 
customer at various stages in the total customer buying process.
(4) different customer segments of the target market to which the value proposition, 
customer relationships and communication efforts are aimed.
(5) governance arrangements which control resource allocations across functions with 
potentially multiple governance forms and actors involved.
(6) key resources including human capital, knowledge, physical assets for example 
stores and inventory, and protected know-how, for example, brands, merchandis-
ing concepts, training programmes, etc.
(7) key activities which deliver the business model and the promise(s) set out in the 
customer-facing side.
Revenue and cost components are included in several business model frameworks, but 
are not considered here as we view them as an outcome or financial expression of the 
business model. The focus in this article is not the financial end result of a business model 
but rather the parts that express the offer to the market, how that offer comes across and 
how it is produced by company activities, resources and partners.
Market orientation
The concept of market orientation has a long pedigree of antecedents (Pfeffer 1978; 
Zeithaml and Zeithaml 1984). The concept became more central to marketing strategy 
through Kohli and Jaworski (1990), Narver and Slater (1990) and Jaworski and Kohli (1993). 
While the emphases of subsequent work differed somewhat, the core theme remained as 
the firm’s ability to gather and manage market intelligence, and use it internally in the 
firm. Slater and Narver (1994) extended the concept to make a clear distinction between 
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a market-driven orientation, in which the firm responded to market conditions, and 
a market-driving orientation, in which firms created and changed the market. 
Subsequent studies (e.g. Kumar, Scheer, and Kotler 2000; Day 1999; Jaworski, Kohli, and 
Sahay 2000; Kumar 1997) refined the distinction between the two orientations, and 
explored their role in shaping marketing strategy. Market-driven behaviour reflects the 
core marketing responsiveness concept of listening to customer demands and then 
responding, whilst the active market-driving behaviour requires a different strategic 
approach and exploits the malleability of the market. Jaworski, Kohli, and Sahay (2000) 
explain the difference by pointing to market-driven behaviour taking market structure as 
well as market behaviour as given, while market driving seeks to influence and shape 
market structure as well as market behaviour. Kumar et al (2000, p 132) argue that market- 
driving firms share certain common features, claiming they are:
● guided by vision rather than traditional market research
● characterized by radical innovation rather than incremental innovation  
● managing sales growth through customer education
● changing the game by destroying industry segmentation and channel configuration
Many of these discussions on the contrast between market-driving and market-driven 
orientations suggest the distinction is binary. We suggest that, for the current study, the 
contrast can more usefully be seen as a continuum between two, possibly, extreme 
positions. This becomes evident when we disaggregate the actions to which these 
orientations apply. Additionally, there can be fluidity in this continuum with changes in 
the actions of the firms as they change their policies. Specific actions can become 
increasingly or decreasingly market driving or driven.
Several empirical studies have used a market-driving/market-driven framework with 
some exploring the concepts in a retail context (e.g. Beverland, Ewing, and Matanda 2006; 
Ghauri, Tarnovskaya, and Elg 2008; Hills and Bartkus 2007; Hills and Sarin, 2003; Elg et al. 
2011; Schindehutte et al, 2008; Tarnovskaya 2007; Tarnovskaya, Elg, and Burt 2008; 
Tuominen, Rajala, and Möller 2004). One general conclusion from this retail-specific 
empirical work is that market-driving strategies seem to be an efficient way of getting 
a foothold in foreign markets, especially markets where the type of market-driving 
retailing in question is a new addition to the market place. From studies cited above, it 
seems clear that a market-driving strategy can help restructure existing consumer markets 
and, for example, develop a more efficient supplier network as a part of its market-driving 
strategy (Elg et al. 2011; Ghauri, Tarnovskaya, and Elg 2008). Through working with 
a market-driving brand strategy, a retail firm can influence the actions of internal stake-
holders as well as relationships with external stakeholders, and influence and drive local 
market level activities (Tarnovskaya, Elg, and Burt 2008). In contrast, international market-
ing has long argued for the need to adapt and embed market strategies when entering 
and trying to establish a position in new foreign markets. The emphasis is on the need to 
become ‘local’ rather than thinking what works on the home market can be replicated 
through an essentially market-driven approach. Most studies generally take a holistic view 
of either approach with firms being market-driven or market -driving across all aspects of 
their business model.
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Much of the research literature on business models and the market-driven/market- 
driving orientation is cross-sectional in its approach. In respect of both these streams of 
literature, the nature of change is frequently lacking. In order to understand the ways that 
the business model and marketing orientation change, the inter-connections between 
these two conceptual streams require study. It has been suggested that market-driving 
and market-driven perspectives are related to the degree to which a firm is established in 
the market, with a change to these perceptions taking place as the firm becomes more 
embedded in the market. If this is the case, then the business model will similarly evolve 
to accommodate the changed market orientation perspective, but in turn changes in the 
business model will reflect back into the change in market orientation. The absence of 
studies on the nature of change is clearly a problem, as it impedes a deeper under-
standing of market orientation and business model performance, not least because 
individual firms are at different points in their evolving relationship with the market. 
The focus on considering the business model and market orientation holistically also 
generates problems for a deeper understanding of market relationships. Whilst different 
aspects of the business model are likely to exhibit different degrees of driving and driven 
behaviour, different marketing activities and resource configurations also are used as 
tools for market-driving or market-driven activity.
Research method
Through in-depth longitudinal case study research (Pettigrew 1990; Yin 2013), it is 
possible to generate unique insights into the complexity of business model and market 
orientation development over time. In our empirical investigation, we present 
a structured attempt to capture IKEA’s development in the Chinese market longitudinally, 
as a process of change over the 10 years from 2006 to 2017. Guided by our research 
question – how do the components of the retail business model and market orientation 
perspective change over time? – we use the framework discussed above that combines 
research on business models and research on marketing orientation, to frame our analysis 
of IKEA’s approach to the Chinese market over this decade.
IKEA was considered a suitable case, since previous studies of the firm have shown it to 
have a clear approach to business model principles and its market orientation has been 
widely discussed (e.g., Ghuari et al. 2008; Elg et al. 2011; Tarnovskaya 2007; Tarnovskaya, 
Elg, and Burt 2008). We limit the study to the activities of IKEA in a single market, China, 
because this market has been subjected to substantial change in the 20 years since IKEA 
entered. Wang (2014) and Siebers (2011) point to relaxations of the tight state control 
over foreign retailers around 2004 that provides us with a reference year from which 
change can be assessed. A further reason for the research design is the long-standing co- 
operation of IKEA with members of the research group, which has regularly allowed 
frequent high-level access to executives and company documentation. In addition, tacit 
knowledge has been acquired during previous research projects.
This paper is based on data collected during interview programs in 2005–2008 and 
2014–2017 (appendix 1) with other informal interviews in intervening years. Data collec-
tion methods for 2005–2008 and analysis were reported in previous publications (Burt, 
Johansson, and Thelander 2011a,b; Johansson and Thelander 2009). As those publications 
had a different focus (marketing strategies of an international retailer) data from these 
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articles have been re-coded to fit the current analysis of a retailer’s business model. The 
data generated in 2005–2008 were broad enough to make re-coding possible. It encom-
passed primary data (interviews with some 10 managers at IKEA, see Appendix 1 for 
details on which job functions were interviewed), secondary data, both the type found in 
business and trade journals, but also internal documents from the retailer in question. 
Observation studies of stores were also completed and are included in the data material. 
These data provide a reference point for the follow-up study of 2014–2017, and can be 
said to represent the situation in China with regards to IKEA around 2006.
The data collected in 2014–2017, to create the later reference point in the longitudinal 
study, reflects IKEA in China in 2016. This data included, as in the initial study, data from 
different sources. The primary data source was 14 interviews, with senior (global) man-
agers at IKEA in Sweden and with managers in China (11 persons in total as a couple of 
informants were interviewed more than once). During fieldwork in China, stores were 
visited regularly, to observe merchandising, store layout and customer interactions, and 
as with the data collected in 2005–2008, secondary data was also collected. This included 
data from business and trade press but also a number of key internal company 
documents.
Using data from different sources makes it possible to triangulate data (Miles and 
Huberman 1994; Silverman 2006), i.e., having multiple datapoints for different areas of 
study. This in itself ensures higher validity than if only one type of data was used.
In the 2005–2008 interviews (which also included interviews with both global man-
agers based in Sweden and managers responsible for different aspects of the business in 
China), the main focus was on IKEA’s ‘marketing strategies’ in China. For the current paper, 
this data needed to be re-coded to capture the different aspects of the business model. As 
the data collection was relatively broad – and as secondary data also existed – it was 
possible to re-code the data.
In the interviews in 2014–2017, we also adopted a broad approach. We started with 
open and general overview questions with regards to the IKEA business in general and 
then the business in Asia and more specifically China. We then focused more specifically 
on the different parts of a business model as well as aspects of market orientation. The 
interviews conducted in China included both strategic management (country manager, 
retail manager etc.) and operational management (PR manager, marketing manager, store 
managers etc.) with detailed knowledge of IKEA’s current marketing strategies. Interviews 
were conducted in Swedish and in English. All interviews – both from 2005 to 2008 and 
from 2014 to 2017 were transcribed. The specific quotations in this paper are drawn from 
interviews in 2014–17.
With regard to the analysis of the data, we were – as is often the case in qualitative 
studies – looking for patterns. The different areas and variables in the framework (for 
example, around business model; value proposition, relationships, channels, customer 
segments, etc.) were taken as the starting point. King’s (2007) template analysis was 
applied to the interviews. We coded relevant mentions relating to different concepts in 
the framework. Key words and phrases/expressions were used to facilitate the coding 
(mentions of customer and areas relating to customers were coded as being about 
customer segments but could also relate to other parts of the business model, e.g., 
customer relationships, value proposition, etc.). Our approach can best be described as 
a process that is iterative in nature, with a constant moving back and forth between data 
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and theory (Bryman and Bell 2015). This is often an abductive approach, which is well 
suited to explorative studies. Previous research is used as a starting point that is then 
combined with emerging patterns during the analysis (Dubois and Gadde, 2002).
Business model dynamics
By 2018, IKEA’s annual turnover had reached €38.8 billion from 422 stores worldwide, 
including those operated by franchisees. The international expansion of IKEA began in 
1963, but increased substantially in the 1970s and 1980s. The business idea that has 
consistently driven the firm has been to offer affordable home furnishings at prices that 
allow as many people as possible to afford them. Availability through low prices is the 
core of the company’s business idea. IKEA had been sourcing products in China from the 
early 1970s and opened stores in Shanghai and Beijing in 1998. By the end of 2006, IKEA 
had four stores in China, the original Shanghai and Beijing stores having been remodeled 
and extended to reflect the ‘standard’ IKEA format and new stores opened in Chengdu 
and Guangzhou. At this time, Shanghai was becoming IKEA’s main hub in the Asian 
market, particularly important with the pending re-entry into the Japanese market. By 
2016, IKEA had grown its presence in China significantly, to 20 stores, including a pick up 
and order outlet in Wenzhou serviced from the Ningbo store, and with a seemingly stable 
growth rate of 2–3 new stores per year. Although stores were still concentrated in the 
metropolitan areas along the east coast and in the north, a few stores had been estab-
lished in central China. With the substantial growth of the Chinese middle-class, the 
home-furnishing market had grown and matured. Our analysis of the business model of 
IKEA in China around 2006 and 2016 is structured using our theoretical framework.
Value proposition
Initially in China IKEA was offering a value proposition that constituted something 
completely new in the market. The offering in the early years was basically the same as 
in all other IKEA markets. For Chinese consumers, the proposition contained a substantive 
market-driving aspect in that IKEA was presenting an offering to the market, rather than 
responding to consumer voices, expressed through the established corporate statement;
IKEA offers a wide range of well-designed, functional home furnishing products at prices so low 
that as many people as possible can afford to buy them. (IKEA.com)
The underlying market-driving value proposition of IKEA in China is essentially the same in 
2006 and 2016. By 2016, however, there is evidence of market-driven trends. Services had 
become increasingly important in the offering providing one example of how IKEA 
needed to adapt to the new market. Home delivery was in its infancy in 2006, but by 
2016 was as high as 60% for furniture in stores in 1st tier cities. Several services have been 
added; home delivery, home assembly, removal and replacement of old kitchens and wall 
mounting services in a market unfamiliar with the concepts of self-assembly and DIY.
Whilst service provision can be seen as a market-driven adjustment, the assortment 
strategy has remained market driving through Scandinavian (non-Chinese) design but 
tactically the detail of product ranges has market-driven adjustments.
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It is our goal to be leader in providing a good life at home. Our value position on the market is to 
make the life better for our customers . . . . And this means that we have to open up and listen to 
the market also, what do they need, not just provide our own solutions. (Region Manager IKEA 
Group Asia 2016)
China followed the global IKEA category structure on assortment range; a base assort-
ment, a selected range and a market-specific local range. Market-driven changes were 
made because apartments in Shanghai, being much smaller than the average European 
apartment, meant that some of the bigger wardrobes, beds, kitchen fittings, and sofas 
were not part of the assortment. In addition, the product range needed to reflect special 
Chinese rooms like the balcony, which is often used as an extra living room or storage 
room. For China, the local range by 2016 contained about 500 products, mostly in 
kitchenware (e.g., chopsticks, cooking utensils, steamers, bowls, containers for products 
that are bought in bulk and stored at home) but also in beds (same sizes as European beds 
but harder mattresses and harder and higher pillows). By 2016, merchandise ranges 
showed more local adaption compared with 2006. The part of the assortment that can 
be adapted for local markets has grown to around 6–7% in China. Senior managers 
interviewed in the Chinese IKEA head office envisage further adaption ahead with an 
increasing need to localise the range available in the market hall.
Adaption of range has increased but we need a more relevant range for example in market hall. 
Because the Chinese has like 12 different bowls, one bowl is for rice, one bowl is for pickles, one 
bowl is for soup, the other one is for hot beverages. And they are different. They have different 
sizes, different shapes, and we, Ikea, are very ignorant giving them the same size and shape of 
bowl in six different colors and patterns. We are not respecting, for whatever reason, their rice 
bowls need to be different. (Marketing Manager IKEA Group China, 2016)
The location of the stores in China is typically closer to core metropolitan nodes and 
public transport complexes than the edge-of-town destination big boxes found in Europe 
and the US. The initial focus in 2006 was to establish stores in areas (and cities) where 
there was a potential for substantial population growth. The potential to drive the market 
was believed to be more likely in areas of rapid population growth. In Shanghai, IKEA 
established two more stores during the review period, one in a similar location to the first 
store (closer to city centre than ‘normal’ IKEA stores) and the second one on the outskirts 
of the city (on the way to Pudong airport), in an area where the population is expected to 
increase rapidly.
The Pudong store is probably further out than our other stores in Shanghai, but on the other 
hand, you can also see that it´s also an area with a lot of residential development. As the city 
grows, a lot of people are moving out to that area. But it is not really highly accessible now by 
public transport but probably will be as more people move there. (Market Intelligence Manager 
IKEA Group China, 2016)
Whilst store location has reflected a market-driving approach, the in-store configuration 
has been adapted over time and reflects market-driven changes. The shopper is still met 
by room settings, but designed to be relevant for Chinese consumers. While the balcony 
as a living space was part of the room plan in 2006, the hallway had been added by 
2016. In many Chinese homes, the hallway is a narrow corridor that is difficult to use as 
effective space. IKEA tries to help furnish that space and shows examples in the room 
settings.
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The difference in store set-up between general IKEA store and store in IKEA China is mainly that 
the hallway – which in many Chinese homes is not a square but a corridor that is difficult to do 
anything really good with – and the balcony is additions in focus. These are furnished, showing 
how IKEA furniture can make better use of these for many Chinese important spaces. (Country 
Manager IKEA Group China, 2016)
A further market-driven change in the store configuration is a smaller self-service area, 
which is an adjustment to higher real estate prices in China (and higher productivity of 
store space) as well as reflecting the proportion of customers who opt for home delivery. 
Another difference in merchandising by 2016 was the increased price-focus throughout 
the store, with clearer signalling of price and more total price solutions for products 
displayed in a given setting. Increased space had also been allocated to the restaurants 
with more seating and a more prominent featuring of the food offer.
The philosophy underpinning the IKEA value proposition remained consistent over the 
10 year period; market driving the standardized IKEA concept has remained the strategic 
overarching focus. Operational processes and implementation routines to deliver the 
value proposition, however, have changed in several ways including a change in the 
role of services, and changes in the use of space in merchandising designs and room 
settings. These reflect aspects of adaption of the core value proposition linked to intro-
ducing a more market-driven tactical orientation over time.
Customer relationships
The relationship of customers to IKEA in China is similar to the rest of the IKEA world, 
being essentially through a market-driving store format with IKEA customers required to 
participate in self-service, learning and understanding the logic of the store. With room 
settings on the first floor, and the market hall and self-service pick-up area on the ground 
floor before the checkouts, the store format demands that customers, as IKEA phrase it, 
‘do their part’, whilst IKEA’s part is providing the total offering, involving unique design 
and low prices. The customer relationship in the store context means customers have to 
navigate the store on their own, understand how to pick things up and carry them around 
the store until finally paying at the checkouts. Even before 2006, IKEA had recognised that 
they needed to be more market driven with more support for Chinese customers 
throughout the store visit, with additional store staff compared to other markets and by 
offering different services like home delivery and home assembly. An IKEA manager 
commented in an interview in 2005:
[. . .] a middleclass Chinese does not own a screwdriver or have any experience, or urge, to carry 
around and assemble big furniture. Here, you always buy that service if you have the money. 
(Country Manager IKEA China, 2005)
Before IKEA started to offer additional services to its Chinese customers, the entrepre-
neurial spirit of the Chinese resulted in chauffeurs and handymen flocking to the store to 
offer their services. The rigidity of the initial market-driving customer relationships gen-
erated the opportunity for these externally supplied services, which were only later taken 
in-house as a market-driven change.
The customer relationship element of the IKEA business model of 2016 shows that 
while there are more services and more staff in the stores compared to IKEA stores in 
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other markets, the underlying customer relationships remain the same; IKEA’s stores are 
driven by the principle of self-service. Visitor numbers have always been high in Asian 
countries, and IKEA China is no exception. Despite increasing the number of staff per 
store, the staffing level per visitor remains lower than in Europe and the US due to high 
visitor numbers. The introduction of the IKEA Family scheme, which now has approxi-
mately 10 million members in China, is also an indication of a closer relationship between 
IKEA and its customers, although market-driving mass-customisation is still the basis of 
the business model in China.
We probably have more staff in the stores in China than in, for example, Europe but we also 
benchmark the productivity on the global level. Of course in general, China productivity is low, 
that is one of the reasons we need to have more visitors in the store. But what we also, and 
particularly this store, what we try to do is, of course when we are looking at our productivities 
also looking at when and where our visitors are coming. Then we try to match at least those 
patterns, particularly comparing between weekdays and weekends. (Store manager, IKEA Group 
China, 2016)
Cultural issues still remain within the workforce with efforts to encourage Chinese staff to 
engage for fully with customers in a market-driven way:
We are trying to work with our co-workers in the stores to be more active viz a viz customers: do 
you need help? Do you have some questions? And we are investing a lot in training for co-workers 
at store level to achieve this. They need to be more active and do selling, active selling, in the 
storage systems, living room storage systems etc. We are investing in kitchen planners and also 
we call it greeters, in the kitchen room settings. (Deputy Country Manager IKEA Group China, 
2016).
Over the decade, a new aspect to the relationship between customers and IKEA has 
emerged namely a digitally facilitated relationship. Whilst the store-based relationship 
remains strong it has been supplemented by online activity that helps strengthen the 
store-based relationship.
IKEA is now working on many channels with communication to the customer; catalogue, on-line 
media, on-line TV (YouTube type) commercials, web etc etc. Still, the store is the main medium as 
there is a need to build home furnishing interest and competence. That is best done in the store. 
(PR and External Communication Manager IKEA Group China, 2016)
The customer relationship component of the core business model has remained essen-
tially a market-driving one. The additional services constitute a necessary adaption and 
have been added over the period of the study to support the underlying relationship. The 
market-driving approach to customer relationships is such a central tenet of the IKEA 
model that has remained a standardised feature despite the massive cultural difference in 
consumer values between China and Scandinavia. The market-driven adaptions are 
modest and supportive of the underlying driving nature of the relationship.
Channels of communication
The different channels of communication employed to build the customer base were 
initially those in the IKEA manual that summarizes a market-driving approach; the store, 
the advertisements (with adaption to fit the tone of voice in the market) and the 
catalogue. As discussed above, the stores in China were initially merchandised in the 
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same way as elsewhere but by 2006, due to customer demands and high visitor numbers, 
additional staff were introduced and services began to be added. Local advertisements in 
2006 were designed to create an interest in the home and home furnishings and focused 
on making small changes (rather than major changes to the home and lifestyle). The local 
advertisements sought to educate consumers about IKEA values and to create a market 
for the IKEA value proposition and as such could be regarded as a market-driving tool 
although inevitably execution was driven by local culture. For decades, the IKEA catalogue 
has been the major cornerstone of IKEA’s communication activities. In 2006, IKEA’s 
market-driving policy was that the catalogue should be delivered to the PMA (primary 
market area), which for the Shanghai store meant over a million people. It turned out to 
be very difficult to implement this policy, as homes in Shanghai either did not have 
postboxes that were big enough to accept the catalogue, or were not regularly checked 
by the resident. This was recognized quickly as a problem and the catalogue was only sent 
to parts of the PMA, and handed out in the stores. Brochures, reminiscent of the catalogue 
but smaller in size and suited to the Chinese market, were created as a market-driven 
solution.
Until 2006, IKEA had always been very analogue in terms of communication channels, 
and the use of the Internet for communication purposes was lagging in all markets. But 
with the launch into the very digital and Internet-prone Japanese market, IKEA realized 
that it needed to explore web communication in China. Not least because for the young 
target customer that IKEA had come to serve in the Chinese market, the web was an 
important information source with market-driving potential. IKEA also realized that it 
could use the web to prepare Chinese customers for the store visit; explaining how the 
store was set up, what was sold at the store and not least how it was sold (self-service with 
added services).
By 2006 it was clear that the catalogue was not the optimal (marketing) instrument in 
the Chinese market so new approaches were necessary. By 2016, distribution of the 
catalogue was increasingly described as ‘a struggle’ by managers and it was recognised 
that it was not an effective communications tool. The catalogue does, however, contain 
home furnishing ideas and suggestions, so it is still seen as a tool to build interest in home 
furnishings and develop the market. The Chinese version of the catalogue was increas-
ingly adapted for the market; it was more ‘functional’ containing more pictures and 
explanations of things that might be taken for granted in markets with a higher level of 
interest and knowledge in home furnishing. Various experiments, including more fre-
quent production (5 per year) were tested to allow wider distribution and greater scope 
for in year price adjustments. Consequently, the value of the catalogue has become 
widely questioned by managers.
A global catalogue is not relevant to us in this market. There are two other important jobs 
relating to the catalogue from a Chinese perspective and that is to secure distribution (which is 
very difficult). And the other challenge is the copywriting. That we have to deliver the right 
wordings or use IKEA tone of voice to say certain sayings in the catalogue. But I have to say, 
sometimes the global version with English expressions is a little bit abstract. (PR and External 
Communication Manager IKEA Group China, 2016)
Well the catalogue has been on and off, it is not really something that fits the Asia market 
generally anymore. . . . . . . for some time in China we did a smaller one (four edits in a year, also 
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an adaptation to a more changing market), but we have since left that version . . . digital is taking 
over. (Region Manager IKEA Group Asia, 2016)
Over the decade, IKEA increased the number of communication channels used to reach 
the customer: catalogue, on-line media, on-line TV (YouQue), web, etc., as the customer 
market in China, as elsewhere in the world, moved towards different channels to shop and 
to get information about products and companies. As in other IKEA markets, social media 
and third-party sites for furnishing products are increasing and the demand for e-com-
merce is also growing.
Of the marketing/promotion tools IKEA China use most of the traditional IKEA tools, including 
IKEA Family and the catalogue. The latter is useful but there are other more useful tools, the 
catalogue builds home furnishing interest and inspiration but can not be used in the PMA the 
way that central IKEA prescribes, it just does not work. The web, on-line TV, social media etc 
through phone are increasing in importance. (Country Manager IKEA Group China, 2016)
By 2018 e-commerce will be possible. This is a big frustration point as it is more than 2 years away 
and the market is moving so fast towards on-line that IKEA risks being left behind. The stores will 
still be the main point but being able to also offer other alternatives is very important to not be 
left behind. 2018 is to far away, IKEA China needs to do something faster than that. (Country 
Manager IKEA Group China, 2016)
Whilst by 2016 IKEA’s main communication channel activity remained based on the 
catalogue and new stores, with these two continuing as the market-driving channels, 
several new communication channels had been introduced over the previous decade. The 
use of the complete catalogue as a market-driving mechanism had been reduced, as new 
channels were introduced with some being market-driven responses but also some of the 
new digital channels were starting to be used as market-driving tools.
Customer segments
In 1998 few foreign retailers operated in China. Ingvar Kamprad wanted to enter China 
earlier, due to ‘the many people’ in the Chinese market with low incomes. Whilst initially 
targeting the whole consumer market, IKEA realized by 2006 that due to low disposable 
incomes, most consumers could not afford to buy anything in the store. Although IKEA 
lowered its prices after the initial launch, the prices still did not fit with the original value 
proposition. With low local production costs and an ability to copy designs a ‘low price’ 
proposition was unobtainable in China. Additionally, Western products and brands car-
ried a certain kudos so prices were expected to be higher than in the local market. 
Consequently, the target consumer segment changed from ‘the many people’ to 
a smaller high-end segment; well-educated, 25–35-year-old consumers living in or close 
to the major cities with stores – Shanghai and Beijing at this time. These consumers were 
often those born under the One Child policy, sometimes labeled as ‘the little emperors’ 
due to parental indulgence of their only child. For this target customer, interest in home 
furnishing was driven by the ‘event’ of moving into a new home, not by self-expression 
through exploring home design ideas to create aspirational, rather than functional, 
homes.
By 2016, the core customer segment was still aged 25–35 with a household income 
well above average. Most customers were couples, with or without a small child, and 
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increasingly the core customer in this target group was female. Even for this target 
customer, the home-furnishing interest is still primarily driven by new home or changing 
home events, rather than by ongoing renovations and refurbishments. Also, as IKEA has 
opened a significant number of stores in China since 2006, the geographical market has 
expanded from the more cosmopolitan 1st tier cites like Shanghai and Beijing to include 
some large second 2nd tier provincial capitals and coastal cities, such as Tianjin, 
Chongqing, Chengdu, Wuhan, and Xiamen.
The income segment for IKEA is really clear, we have a highly emerging middle class, being quite 
affluent, so we are saying that everyone underneath 2000 RNB per month, will not buy home 
furnishing at the moment. . . . . . . Chinese customers do not believe in this democratic brand thing, 
as western people. So we have to say in China, if you want to be for everyone, you are for no one. 
(Marketing Manager IKEA Group China, 2016)
The target market, whilst becoming larger due to store openings and a wider geographi-
cal reach, has not changed fundamentally over the decade but implementation makes it 
different from the espoused corporate target of IKEA. There has been a market-driven 
response in China to accept the reality of income levels and cultural aspects of lifestyle 
resulting in a more constrained target market, driven by different motivations and 
attitudes to home furnishings than in the west.
Governance arrangements
IKEA has always sought to control the brand all the way from sourcing to the customer 
carrying product out of the store (Dahlvig 2012). IKEA’s model of retail operations 
governance is to operate under franchise from Inter IKEA Systems B.V. The largest 
franchisee is INGKA Group (often referred to as IKEA Group), operating around 80% of 
stores worldwide. Control of the brand is central in IKEA’s business model; products are 
developed in-house, distributed around the world by IKEA owned purchasing organiza-
tions using IKEA’s global supply chain, sold through IKEA branded stores and all products 
(except food products before 2010) carry the IKEA brand. The need to provide additional 
services in the Chinese stores required the involvement of third-party suppliers for home 
delivery, assembly, etc. But in 2006, most activities in IKEA China were operated under the 
governance of the IKEA Group. Thus, governance was for the most part within the IKEA 
Group but third-party service providers were being invited to help deliver services and 
support. This trend started before 2006 and has continued albeit relatively slowly. Control 
of the brand generates a consistency in the governance processes over to the 
2006–16 period with the brand itself remaining a strong market-driving factor.
Control has been maintained over the supply chain. The supply chain was a challenge 
on entering China, as products had to be imported from Europe and elsewhere and were 
subject to heavy import duties. By 2006, IKEA had turned around the supply chain and 
about 70% of product was sourced from Chinese suppliers (unique in the IKEA world). By 
2016 however, IKEA China mirrored the ‘normal’ IKEA supply chain and local sourcing had 
decreased to 40% and some Chinese suppliers had entered the IKEA global supply 
network. The need for local sourcing to ensure low prices and availability, essential in 
the early years in China, was now less important. General price decreases, for example, the 
price of Billy bookcase has halved over the decade, owing to work on the supply chain in 
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other locations, and Chinese price rises due to increased costs, have contributed to this 
situation. IKEA of Sweden (IOS), the product development organisation within IKEA, has 
opened a development facility in Shanghai. This helps with product development for the 
Chinese market but also contributes to the whole IKEA group developing products in 
China that can later be produced in other markets across the world. China has changed 
from being the exception, in having local sourcing, to being a normal part of the general 
IKEA global supply chain.
Initial market-driven moves to increase local sourcing in the immediate post entry 
period have been reversed and market-driving activity has increased with more standar-
dised processes and routines introduced over the 2006–16 period. This has reduced the 
market-driven aspect of supply chain processes in China in favour of the market-driving 
approach evident across IKEA global supply chains.
Key Resources
From a key resource perspective, as in all markets the main resources are the store, the 
merchandise and the people. The dependence on these three resources has not changed, 
but the nature and exploitation of the resources has changed substantially. The store, 
with its unique look, layout and merchandise, was key to making an initial impact with the 
target group. Over time, as noted above, some adaptions to store layout have been made 
to reflect local market expectations and behaviours. In 2006, the IKEA merchandise was 
a major key resource as Western and Scandinavian design was new to many of the target 
consumers. As the customer moved towards new channels in search of information on 
products so IKEA responded with more products designed for the China market. There is 
also increasing competition in the Chinese market, making the merchandise offer less 
unique than before and more open to price competition.
In respect to human resources, IKEA has a flat company culture with an emphasis on 
employees taking responsibility and showing initiative. This resulted in problems in the 
immediate post-entry period and was still considered a problem in 2006. Interviewees 
commented that Chinese culture did not emphasize these characteristics, but was con-
structed around a hierarchical structure and focused on executing instructions. Initially, all 
main positions at the Chinese IKEA office were held by managers from the ‘old’ IKEA 
world; Sweden, Germany, and the UK. By 2016 almost all key positions, including store 
management, were filled with Chinese professionals, who were able to adapt to the IKEA 
organizational culture alongside local culture and traditions. With around 2,000 new 
employees required each year in order to meet the store target of 30 by 2020 it has 
become essential to have some adaptions to Chinese workplace lifestyles.
In Harbin we opened a year and a half ago and the people that opened that store have been 
training at other stores but they were recruited from Harbin because they are going to work there 
eventually when we open the store there. We want the local talent, the local knowledge, we do 
not believe in the expats system other than for some exceptions at service office. If the 
competence is available in China, we get it from here. (Region Manager IKEA Group Asia, 2016)
Recruiting the right people is still a big challenge in China. Competences is a big challenge, home 
furnishing interest, and coworkers a big challenge, (Marketing Manager IKEA Group China, 
2016)
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where (do) we find people who are educated, who are smart but also willing to be down to earth and 
take the step, and work with normal people, work with customers, work with the details. So I think 
that is one of the challenges (PR and External Communication Manager IKEA Group China, 2016)
The three key resources (store, merchandise, people) underpin the market-driving philo-
sophy but the use of these resources has become slowly more market-driven as IKEA has 
expanded within China and resource management has become gradually adapted to the 
Chinese market. The market-driving philosophy remains but is being tempered by opera-
tional necessity.
Key activities
The objectives of IKEA identified in the 2006 research remained in 2016, but implementa-
tion has changed. The objectives are those of any retailer: attracting customers to the 
store, getting them to shop, taking care of them and making sure they come back. 
However, the key activities to meet these objectives have changed over the decade. 
Several key activities were stimulated by what the IKEA interviewees considered as a lack 
of Chinese consumer interest in home furnishings – which needed to be encouraged for 
IKEA to be successful in the long run. Activities in store and on the web tried to create and 
nurture this interest. Key activities were very much about finding the right channels and 
the right message for the target group in China. A web presence needed to be initiated 
and developed, and the catalogue made into something that could work in the Chinese 
market. IKEA’s positioning was less about price (unlike in most IKEA markets), and more 
about making a new home. Initially, building local supply chain relationships was essential 
in order to control costs and have affordable prices.
Observing the position in 2016, key activities have changed. As the Chinese market 
matures, greater use is made of traditional market research methods, i.e., listening to and 
building on market data, to adjust the customer offer. This entails the targeting of 
important customer groups and segments, attempts to understand what their interests 
are, what media they use and what their incomes and behaviours are, etc. The emerging 
focus is on new as well as old channels. As the message, compared to 2006, is now more 
about price competition (as market competition has increased), the methods to commu-
nicate the best offer and the best deals for the target groups becomes more important. 
Another key activity is managing information dissemination to an increasingly digital and 
demanding customer.
With consumers becoming more conversant with how IKEA operates, market-driving 
activity in the key activities has been less apparent. At the same time, however, market 
driving through the use of digital media has increased in importance thus changing the 
nature of market-driving activities. Additionally, the employment of more marketing 
research methods has enabled IKEA to become more market driven through traditional 
targeted market segmentation approaches.
The business models of 2006 and 2016
IKEA is often reputed to be an exemplar of a global retailer that is market-driving through 
a strong vision and business idea, yet there was an immediate post-entry need to change 
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or adapt some of the ‘standard’ elements of the IKEA business model to local conditions in 
order to get a foothold in the market. Whilst the focus on ‘the many people’ with low 
priced yet good quality products, is still a strong value within IKEA, in the case of China, 
adjustments to the original vision had to be made, making it more market-driven rather 
than market-driving.
The launch of the ‘big blue and yellow box’ was undoubtedly market-driving in 1998, 
and was still so in 2006. But by then, the Chinese market had become accustomed to 
foreign retailers with similar big-box concepts. Although a different target customer 
segment emerged, the set-up of the store, the focus on self-service and self-assembly 
was primarily market driving. Whilst there was also evidence of a lot of market-driving 
customer education, eventually responsive ‘adjustments’ (services) were required that 
were more in line with being market driven. The big box, to some extent, reconfigured the 
channels for home furnishing in the Chinese market that were dominated by traditional 
furniture retailers, working very much with bespoke solutions and traditional Chinese 
style furnishing designs. The IKEA store was a new concept, changing furniture buying, in 
particular offering everything for the home in one place, not in many different local shops. 
There are stories of how IKEA with its new store concept overwhelmed expectations of 
how home furnishing retailing operated in China and what products the consumer could 
buy for their home.
While the established IKEA business model called for low price, centralized sourcing, 
new design and self-assembly/self-service retailing in non-central locations, IKEA China in 
2016 has both adapted that model in some areas but has reinforced and even strength-
ened it in other ways. Market research seems to be a major new addition to the marketing 
function within IKEA China, with a focus on a segmentation approach, the orientation 
seems more market driven than market driving. As IKEA searches for new markets by 
opening stores in major cities with over a million inhabitants, it reinforces the need to 
introduce and educate more customers to the IKEA way of home furnishing. Also, in these 
new locations, channels for home furnishing are being reconfigured by the entry of IKEA, 
as was the case in Shanghai and Beijing in the early years. With the growth of ‘new’ 
channels of communication like social media and the fact that IKEA has been in the 
Chinese market for 20 years, IKEA’s ‘cult’ status is likely to travel to the new locations, 
possibly creating a buzz around the brand, the stores and the products. With the concept 
increasingly well known within the Chinese market and with consumers increasingly 
accustomed to Western retailers and their store concepts the potential for providing an 
overwhelming ‘new’ customer experience becomes more limited.
Discussion and conclusions
IKEA’s expansion in China has been substantial. Two decades after market entry, several of 
the largest IKEA stores in the world were in China. The business model of IKEA in China, 
through incremental change, has become quite different from that found in Europe and 
the US. The original ‘twist’, on entry to the market, with more services and store personnel 
to support the self-service model was implemented more fully over the 10-year period 
under review. Also, the range has been adjusted steadily with the addition of new Chinese 
home furnishing products or adaptions to better fit the Chinese market. The supply chain 
for the Chinese market initially was standardised on the IKEA model, then became more 
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local and then became more integrated into the ‘normal’ global IKEA supply chain. The 
nature of the market orientation associated with the various components of the business 
model changed over the decade under review. Some components, formerly with 
a market-driving orientation, became more influenced by market-driven behaviour whilst 
in others the initial orientation was reinforced as IKEA became established in the market.
An important observation is that the physical IKEA store remained the main customer 
contact point with adaptions to the Chinese living style, although the urban environment 
is very different from most IKEA countries and China is a market that is rapidly moving 
from analogue to digital, with a fast-growing consumer demand for e-commerce solu-
tions. Here the IKEA business model now faces future challenges. To maintain interest 
amongst existing customers, IKEA’s response to an increasingly digital society has to be an 
important addition to the future business model but it is unclear whether these digital 
moves will be viewed as market driving to create new markets or as a market-driven 
response with digital solutions being a channel response to consumer demands. The IKEA 
catalogue is increasingly being adapted to suit the demands of the Chinese market; 
however, the question is if these adaptions will solve the problem presented by 
a greater demand for digital solutions to purchasing. The catalogue, as much as the 
large physical store, is a unique feature of the IKEA market-driving proposition, but that 
does not mean that it works in all markets or that it cannot change in response to local 
markets.
The generic business model of IKEA is place driven, with the model based on key 
resources that are operated and implemented in a physical place. The store, the assort-
ment and the people all contribute in creating a unique customer offer. This offer under-
pins customer relationships and ways of creating customer value. IKEA shares this place- 
based business model with many other retailers. Increasingly the business model is 
affected by changing consumer demands where place is less important. If competitive 
advantage is created or encapsulated in a place, the future may hold some challenges as 
place is becoming less important to customers, as they are less willing to physically visit 
the place to buy things. The market advantage of having a highly efficient, essentially 
market driving, sales operation within large fixed physical spaces becomes less important. 
This issue was becoming apparent by 2016. IKEA is not unique in responding to this issue 
with other retailers potentially having to evaluate the components of their business 
model and evaluate the changing nature of their marketing orientation within that 
model. The approach, as illustrated for IKEA in this paper, has potentially wider applic-
ability for research on retailers with expansion strategies in rapidly changing markets.
From the study of IKEA in China, several conclusions can be drawn. Market behaviours 
used by a retailer to establish itself in a market are either not accepted by the market or 
are accepted and become part of the prevailing market norm. This is the case wherever 
these activities lie on a perceived continuum between market-driving and market-driven 
behaviour. When market-driving behaviour and activities become accepted as successful 
they continue but change and develop whilst remaining market-driving. The accepted 
market-driven practices evolve continuously in response to local market changes. The 
relative strength and balance of market-driving and market-driven activities change. 
Many of the previous studies in this area of marketing strategy have not considered 
changes in practice over time, pointing to a static dichotomy between market-driving and 
market-driven approaches. Rather than considering a firm in this binary way the dynamic 
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reality is more complex with differences in the degree to with driving and driven activities 
operate and interact. Discussions of market-driving and market-driven approaches need 
to have a time element included and be seen in terms of a continuum of behaviours if 
they are to be of value in academic discussion or in managerial practice.
In addition to considering the time dimension, identifying the market-driving and 
market-driven activities in the different parts of the business model is important. At any 
one time, there is a balance between driving and driven activities across the firm. This is 
very evident in IKEA which often is suggested as a market-driving organisation but as we 
have shown IKEA has parts of its business model which are clearly market-driven. Whilst 
intangible aspects, for example, governance, brand and corporate values, etc., may be 
consistently market- driving the more tangible operational aspects, for example, customer 
relationships, shop floor layout, assortment ranging, etc. become more market-driven as 
IKEA becomes more embedded in the market. Disaggregation of the business model is 
essential therefore if the market-driven-driving paradigm is used to evaluate marketing 
orientation or used to justify managerial routines in a management context.
These findings raise questions over the dangers of generalised use of the market 
driving-driven, paradigm when used for the analysis of the internationalisation of retail-
ing, and potentially other customer- 
facing sectors. The changes in the business model that occur in the internationalisation 
process are more complex and nuanced than the dichotomous representation these 
paradigms often suggests. This is not to argue that the paradigm has no value but the 
value may be in encouraging a more dynamic and disaggregated analysis of the inter-
nationalisation process. Exploring the market-driving activities in retailing can also pro-
vide some redress to the overly passive view of retailing as having to be utterly responsive 
to consumer demands and foibles, as happens in some approaches to use of the 
standardisation vs adaption paradigm.
IKEA is a dominant retailer in many markets, particularly in Europe where it has 
operated over several decades. In rapidly growing markets, such as China, and culturally 
very different markets, such as Japan, IKEA has a weaker market share. Nationally based 
retailers, for example, Red Star Macalline in China and Nitori in Japan have built large 
market shares and strong brand recognition through responsiveness to local market 
demands. Although their business models are very different from IKEA, for example, 
Nittori has around the same number of stores in Japan as IKEA has worldwide and Red 
Star Macalline has a strong online presence additional to the stores, nonetheless the form 
of analysis we have used in this paper, of disaggregating the components of the business 
model and evaluating the market orientation of these components, is applicable in these 
other contexts.
In this paper, we show how a deeper understanding of the change of an international 
retailer’s marketing strategies and practices can be obtained through a research approach 
combining analysis of business model components and the market driving/driven para-
digm. We have applied this approach, using IKEA in China as our empirical basis to move 
analysis away from the dichotomy of the standardise-adapt framework. We limited our 
study to focus on a period of rapid expansion after the initial entry and prior to complete 
market cover. We also limited our study to China which we selected as illustrative of 
a market undergoing rapid development. Despite these limitations, the approach has 
wider applicability. In its use, we present new insights into the dynamics of international 
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retailing and show the value of an approach that considers the changes that occur when 
we disaggregate a retail business model.
Note
In 2018 IKEA Group changed its name to Ingka Group whilst retaining the IKEA brand on stores. In 
this paper we have used the corporate terminology, IKEA, that existed when the interviews were 
undertaken.
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Appendix 1: Interviewees
2005-2008
(1) CEO IKEA Group
(2) Former CEO IKEA Group
(3) Region Manager IKEA Group Asia
(4) Country Manager IKEA Group China
(5) Marketing Manager IKEA Group China
(6) Deputy Marketing Manager IKEA Group China
(7) Communication Manager IKEA Group China
(8) Distribution Manager IKEA Group China
(9) PR Manager IKEA Group China
(10) Store Manager XuHui Store, Shanghai IKEA Group China
2014-2017
(1) Retail and Expansion Manager IKEA Group (responsible for all retail operations in IKEA Group) 
(first interview)
(2) Retail and Expansion Manager IKEA Group (responsible for all retail operations in IKEA Group) 
(second interview)
(3) Customer Experience Manager IKEA Group (responsible for customer experience in all IKEA 
Group stores) (first interview)
(4) Customer Experience Manager IKEA Group (responsible for customer experience in all IKEA 
Group stores) (second interview)
(5) Region Manager IKEA Group Asia (first interview)
(6) Region Manager IKEA Group Asia (second interview)
(7) Country Manager IKEA Group China
(8) Deputy Country Manager IKEA Group China
(9) Marketing Manager IKEA Group China
(10) PR and External Communication Manager IKEA Group China
(11) Market Intelligence Manager IKEA Group China
(12) Store Manager XuHui Store, Shanghai IKEA Group China
(13) Store Manager Pudong Store, Shanghai, IKEA Group China
(14) Store Manager Baoshan Store, Shanghai, IKEA Group China
Stores in operation in China as of 2019 
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City Date of opening
Shanghai (Xyhui) 1998 (closed and replaced 2003)























Beijing (Wuesong) experience centre* 2018
Xu Zhou 2018
*originally pick up and order point.
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